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THE EVOLUTION OF MECHANISMS AND INSTITUTIONS FOR A EUROPEAN 




The troublesome evolution of mechanisms and institutions for 
the formation and execution of a common European foreign posture 
represents a microcosm of the wider story of European integration 
within the EEC framework. For within this evolutionary tale are 
encapsulated all the principal ambiguities, conflicting forces 
and contradictions which have characterized the European
Community from its inception.
If we look at the starting point of Post World War European 
integration we might have expected the field of foreign affairs 
to have a certain priority in the new transnational constructs 
being created. After all the external incentives for such an 
evolution -- the Cold War, the inherent logic of transforming 
eventual internal economic strength into external trading power, 
the nascent desire among some of the European partners
(especially France) to create a third "bloc" in a increasingly 
dichotomous world order —  already existed in the early 50s. And 
yet all attempts to steer the evolution of European integration 
in these directions seemed to fail; within the Coal and Steel 
Community established at the beginning of the decade and the 
Economic Community established at the close of the decade, 
foreign affairs, even of a strictly economic character were 
relatively limited and the thrust of European Community growth in 
the early years was principally internal. It is only in later 
years, towards the end of the 60s and in the 70s and 80s that we 
find a veritable explosion in the external posture of the 
Community both in processes and structures designed for this 
area of activity as well as in substantive relations with third 
states.
How does one explain this trend which seems all the more 
strange when we remember that historically, the external 
environment and foreign affairs were the principal factors which 
were instrumental in bringing about closer unions among states?
I shall start our inquiry by examining, in a theoretical 
and comparative way, the peculiarities of evolving a common 
foreign posture in non-unitary actors. Against this background, 
I shall describe the principal phases in the evolution of Euro­
pean mechanisms and institutions and in particular the emergence 
of the Framework for Political Cooperation -- the main foreign 
policy instrument of the Member States of the European Community. 
Finally, I shall suggest, briefly, a few evaluative criteria to 




























































































A. The Historical, Conceptual and Comparative Framework.
The European Community is not a federal state nor is it 
aspiring to become one. Like federal states, however, it is a 
non-unitarv political and legal system. There is a constant 
tension between the central (general) power and the constituent 
units; a continuous interaction between centrifugal and 
centripetal forces. In order to understand better the European 
process it may be useful to contrast it with other non-unitary 
actors and in particular the federal state. Many of the problems 
which Europe faces in constructing mechanisms for a common 
foreign posture derive from her non-unitary character rather 
than, simply, disagreement among the partners about the possible 
content of a foreign policy. And since we are concerned with 
mechanisms and institutions rather than substance it is useful to 
concentrate on this essential structural characteristic of the 
Community. Through the differences (and occasional similarities) 
with these other non-unitary actors we may gain insight into the 
very special and unprecedented nature of the European Community 
foreign policy apparatus.
Typically, in the history of most federal states, the 
international environment provided one of the cardinal incentives 
for initial unification or for the movement from confederal 
arrangements to some form of federation. 1_/ And although 
constitutions of federal states, normally based on a doctrine of 
enumeration of powers between central government and the 
constituent units, describe with greater or lesser detail the 
respective competences allocated to each level of government, 
"...it is usually assumed that the foreign relations of a 
federation will be controlled predominantly, if not exclusively, 
by the general government of the whole territory." 2/ (This as we 
shall see contrasts sharply with the European Community wherein 
foreign policy was precisely that area which the integrating 
Member States sought most jealously to exclude from the 
competences of the central Community organs).
A useful prism through which to illustrate the point is 
provided by the manner in which states contract international 
treaties. The treaty making experience is important since 
treaties remain to date the principal means through which the EC 
conducts its external relations.
Let us examine first the collective experience of federal 
states which in fact demonstrates strong converging trends. The 
first issue concerns the question of international personality 
and capacity of member units of a federation. Can the member
1. This theme is discussed more fully in Weiler, The External
Legal Relations of Non-Unitary Actors: Mixity and the Federal
Principle, in D. O'Keefe and H.G. Schermers (eds.) Mixed 
Agreements (1983). See also Cappelletti, Seccombe, Weiler, 
Introduction , Integration Through Law, (1985) which I have used 
and on which I have built.




























































































States of a federal state conduct an independent foreign policy? 
In many federations this is denied constitutionally.
Historically, even in federations such as the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Switzerland and to a certain measure the USA, where 
there is some constitutional provision for member state
international capacity, the actual exercise of such capacity has 
been dying. In recent times member states have rarely concluded 
independent treaties and have preferred to rely on the federal 
government with, as in the FRG, certain constitutional 
guarantees.
For its part, the world order (as encapsulated in public 
international law) takes little cognizance of the internal 
structure of federations: "Federal clauses" (whereby other
states took cognizance of the internal federal character of a 
state) were always an inconvenient disturbance, at best tolerated 
and for the most part resisted, and both international capacity 
and international responsibility (the hallmarks of statehood and 
sovereignty) were only grudgingly and to a limited and declining 
extent accorded to constituent units of federations. From the 
legal point of view the world order is composed of unitary 
actors.
Not surprisingly, the internal treaty-making power of the 
central government has been construed in most federal states in 
very wide terms. With a few theoretical exceptions the general 
trend is to recognize plenary treaty-making power limited by 
substantive constitutional provision but not by allocational 
ones. In other words, in all federal states, treaty-making power 
has not been limited to those areas over which the central 
government enjoys internal competences. And to cap it all, with 
the well known exception of Canada, and to a smaller extent the 
Federal Republic of Germany, federal (central) governments have 
been allowed by constitutional courts to implement treaties even 
if the implementing legislation crosses the internal demarcation 
of competences. Court after Court has ruled that the exigencies 
of the external environment may override the internal federal 
demarcation.
We see then, from the experience of federal states, that 
the conduct of foreign policy does not lend itself easily to non- 
unitary structures and that when one comes to this field the 
tendency -- both in internal political terms and in the external 
international environment —  is to opt for single actors. But how 
does this tendency square with the rationale behind federal 
arrangements —  déconcentration of power, participation, rational ; 
division of governmental powers among the participating units? 
Are foreign affairs to be excluded from this rationale and if not 
how does one explain the unitary tendency in federal states?
Even if federations have a unitary external posture, it is 
arguable that the federal principle may vindicate itself in the 
internal process of foreign policy-making. Thus, in schematic 
terms, although it will be, say, the US qua single state that 
concludes a treaty, Senate approval could mean that constituent 
state interests would have been represented before ratification. 
To be sure, the role of parliamentary organs at the central level 
in the foreign policy process, especially in the US (but not in 




























































































years by imposing a measure of democratic control on the foreign 
policy field, historically regarded as a domaine reserve of the 
executive. But it could be argued that federal legislative 
organs even if designed to represent state interests have lost 
some of their mediatory function and have come to be regarded as 
part of the central authority —  displaying less sensitivity, or 
ability, in this sphere to vindicate their original 
constituencies. Indeed, the process of foreign policy making is 
for the most part not conceived as being a legitimate interest of 
the constituent units qua units of the federation.
We should note however that this unitarist image must be 
qualified, at least partially, by political fact. Across the 
board we find that even where federal governments were given the 
possibility to encroach on member state competences through the 
exercise of treaty-making power, they have been very reluctant to 
conclude treaties which would have that effect. Moreover, there 
is a growing trend of evolving structures of cooperative 
federalism to overcome some of the problems to which the unitary 
solution gives rise. It remains, however, true that in the 
strict constitutional/international legal sense, federal states 
face the world as unitary actors and their internal policy 
process is essentially centralized.
Our problem of trying to explain the fact that in the 
federal state, based on a notion of division of competences, such 
exclusive power is allowed to rest in the hands of central 
government remains unanswered. The answer, I believe must be 
found in the origins of the federal state.
Historically the rationale behind this exclusive 
concentration of foreign affairs powers in the hands of the 
central government rested on two premises.
The first premise was that in matters of external relations 
a united posture would maximize the power of the individual 
units. This was particularly felt in the areas of defense and 
security. One can go even further. The unified foreign posture 
and international personality emerged probably as the single most 
important factors in giving federations, in their formative 
years, the quality of Statehood as compared with all other types 
of federal arrangements such as confederations. This was 
certainly true in the formal relations among actors in the world 
order and recognized in public international law.3/ But a unified 
foreign and defense posture did not have only an external and 
formal significance. The federation's flag, the "federal" army, 
the "national" Anthem and other such paraphernalia - all being, 
at least in part, expressions of the unified posture vis-a-vis 
"outsiders" imbued the formal distinction with internal social 
meaning. Thus even at the social and human level, whereas 
citizens of a federation could in internal matters regard 
themselves as being Texans or Tasmanians, vis-a-vis the outside 
world they would normally regard themselves as respectively 
Americans or Australians. To be a federal state was to have a





























































































But this premise alone would not explain the willingness of
the member states of federations -- especially in formative 
periods where traditionally there was a much stronger insistence 
than today on preserving the rights and autonomy of the 
constituent units -- to vest the execution of virtually all 
foreign power in the hands of the central government.
It is here that the second premise comes into play. For
there was a widespread belief that matters of foreign policy and 
contacts with foreign states would, ipso facto, interest the 
general government and would, by contrast, be of lesser relevance 
to the constituent states and the domestic powers usually 4/ 
vested in them. It seemed therefore that one could gain the 
benefits that a unified foreign posture was to yield without 
encroaching on the internal division of powers between the two 
levels of government as regards domestic policy.
It is this premise which accounts for the fact that until 
the advent of the European Community there was with few 
exceptions^/ no such thing as a genuine "federal foreign policy". 
Federal states distinguished themselves by their unified, non- 
federal, external relations.
Finally, there was perhaps the belief, characteristic of
early federal theory, that the representation of state interests 
within federal government, would give sufficient protection to 
state interests - if indeed these would exist.
Let us now examine critically these premises and their
ramifications. The first premise whereby a united posture is more 
effective than individual foreign policies arguably retains much 
of its force till this day and constitutes the principal 
mobilizing drive for those pushing for further integration in the 
external pos'ture of the EEC. By contrast, it is doubtful if the 
second premise was ever wholly correct 6/. And in today's inter­
dependent world it is clear that there are few areas of so called 
domestic jurisdiction which do not have some international 
dimension and equally few areas of international activity which 
do not have internal ramifications.7/
We are now in a position to understand the evolutionary
dialectics and conceptual framework of the foreign relations 
apparatus of the EEC. The emergence of European institutions and 
mechanisms for the formulation and conduct of a common external
4. Of course there was an interest in questions of foreign trade 
even by constituent units.
5. The Soviet Union claims some sort of federal foreign posture
with the advent of Byelorussia and the Ukraiane. See VJeiler, note 
1 supra at 35ff.
6. Note 4 supra.




























































































posture was not a result of a preconceived and rational design.
It was instead the outcome of a process conditioned by 
conflicting interests and forces.
On the one' hand, the belief in the alleged benefits of
having a unified foreign posture, of 'speaking with one voice', 
at least in some contexts, provided the "Member States with
integrative_impetus. Moreover, the fact that internal matters
tend* to have an international dimension meant that even in areas 
where the Community was not vested with explicit external 
competences, there was pressure to create such competence so as 
to enable the EEC to pursue in an adequate manner its internal 
policies.8/
On the other hand it easy to understand the source of Member 
State ambivalence and resistance to a unified foreign policy: The 
very fact that historically a unitary external posture and single 
international personality emerged as the hallmarks of the federal 
State -distinguishing it from other non-unitary entities - was 
and remains a potent potion, maybe even poison, for the Member 
States. Even the most integration minded of these did not bargain 
for the creation of a European "super - state" under whatever 
federal nomenclature. The area of foreign relations acquired thus 
a sensitivity unparalleled in any other field.
Furthermore, the patent falsity of the abovementioned second 
premise, that one can delimit the interaction of internal and 
external powers, means that were the Member States to vest the 
exclusive conduct of foreign policy in Community institutions 
they would not only lose their much cherished international 
personality, but would also be impeded from autonomously 
conducting national policy in areas which at first sight might 
appear to be wholly within domestic jurisdiction. The history of 
all federal states has demonstrated clearly that implementation 
by federal government of federal foreign policy involves 
inevitable excursions into and encroachment of the areas reserved 
to states.9/
Given then these conflicting interests we should not be
surprised to find that all activities of the Community in the 
international environment are imbued with a strong ambivalence on 
the part of the Member States. The alleged external utility of 
the joint posture is always weighed against the alleged 
individual statal loss of power. The Member States often want the 
substantive "benefits" but without paying the structural "costs".
I shall analyze first the initial pattern and evolution of
the Community posture in the external economic relations field, 
and then develop more fully the structure and purpose of its 
political foreign posture through the Framework for Political 
Cooperation. Finally in this study I shall indicate the
8. See Pescatore, External Relations in the Case-Law of the Court
of Justice of the European Communities, 16 CML Rev. 615 (1979).
9. See I.Bernier, International Legal Aspects of Federalism (1973)




























































































breakdown between the two external activity areas and reflect on
a conceptual and evaluative framework into which the external 
posture may be fitted.
B. The Treaty Framework ^ The External Relations of the EEC
a. The starting point.
The EEC was created in 1 958 against the failure of the more
ambitious proposals in the mid-50s for European political and 
Defense Communities. European integration was to evolve 
principally on the economic plane. The reluctance of the Member 
States to extend their joint venture to defense (outside the MATO 
framework) and to foreign policy was reflected in the Treaty of 
Rome in two ways.
First, an "iron curtain" was drawn between what later became
known as 'high' and 'low' politics. The Community was to have 
inter-national competence only in respect of external (economic) 
relations (low politics). The Member States would retain in their 
individual capacity exclusive competence over foreign affairs 
(high politics). There could thus be a series of European 
commercial and trade agreements with many countries commencing 
already in the early 60s.1_0/ There could not be -- until the 
creation of the Framework for Political Cooperation in the late 
60s —  even the semblance of a joint European policy towards the 
political issues besetting the region. Here one would have to 
have a French policy, a Dutch policy and so forth.
Anticipating a theme to which I may return below, this very 
example serves to illustrate the untenability of a conceptual and 
operational distinction between high and low politics - between 
external relations and political cooperation. For one has to be 
singularly blind and dogmatic to believe that external economic 
relations operate in a political vacuum and that one can pursue a 
vigorous foreign policy without recourse to economic 
instruments.JM_/ The Member States were to learn that lesson 
slowly and reluctantly. The theoretical division, so neatly 
drawn in the Treaties setting up the Community, was to become 
slowly an unworkable solution, despite its "ideological" 
attraction.
Second, even within external relations, the international
capacity of the Community expressed in particular through its 
treaty making power was explicitly granted only in relation to 
the international trade policy of the Community. Thus the Treaty 
provides that
10. Interestingly, the first Association Agreements were already 
then of the Mixed type.
11. This was evident in the debate over the participation of the 




























































































the common commercial policy shall be based on uniform
principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff 
rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements
...12/
The Treaty did provide for the conclusion by the Community of 
Association Agreements in fairly wide terms:
The Community may conclude with a third State, a union of 
States or an international organization agreements 
establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and 
obligations, common action and special procedures....13/
But despite this wide language, when Association Agreements
covered matters which could not be regarded as coming under the 
general subject matter of international trade, the Member States 
prevented the Community from concluding such agreements alone and 
insisted on joint participation. Here as well the untenability of 
the initial document is evident. Could the Community which had 
explicit competences, at times even exclusive, over matters such 
as fisheries and transport, operate as if the Europe of the Six 
(and later Nine and Ten) was a planet with no connections with 
third states and other international actors? Could there be a 
Community fisheries policy without Community agreements 
(treaties) with other fishing nations sharing the same high seas?
b. Mutation of the starting point.
For these and other reasons it was not long before the
initial Treaty formulae were subjected to powerful mutations. 
The pattern of external relations today is a far cry from the 
initial blueprint. I may mention in particular the following 
developments in the context of external economic relations:
a. In quantity external contacts of the Community formalized
through international agreements have grown and run into 
hundreds. The Community also has a network of international 
contacts through legations which is equally impressive.J_4/ Any 
expectation that the external relations of the Community could or 
would be contained was inevitably proved erroneous.
b. This growth was and is connected to two constitutional 
changes effected by decisions of the European Community Court of 
Justice. In a landmark decision of 1971 15/, the Court gave a 
much wider interpretation to the treaty making powers of the
12. Article 113 EEC.
13. Art 238 EEC.
14. Most First and Third World countries have legations to the EC.




























































































Community and hence to its ability to engage in international
affairs. The Court held first that:
in its external relations the Community enjoys the capacity
to establish contractual links with third countries over the 
whole field of objectives defined in Part One of the 
Treaty.... 
c It added that
[s]uch authority arises not only from an express conferment 
by the Treaty -- as is the case with Articles 1 1 3 and 114 
for tariff and trade agreements ... but may equally flow 
from other provisions of the Treaty and from measures 
adopted, within'-'the framework of those provisions, by the 
Community institutions.
Thus the treaty making power of the Community would extend
to all areas in relation to which the Community had internal 
power. The confinement of Community agreements to international 
commerce and trade was removed.
c. In a third development the Court, in the so-called ubber
Case ga^e an extremely wide interpretation to the reach of the 
Community Common Commercial Policy. This was significant since in 
relation to this policy the community was not only entitled to 
conclude agreements but had exclusive competence vis-a-vis the 
Member States.16/
Specifically the Court held that
[i]t is ... not possible to lay down, for Article 113 of the 
EEC Treaty, an interpretation the effect of -which would be 
to restrict the common commercial policy to the use of 
instruments intended to have an effect only on the the 
traditional aspects of external trade to the exclusion of 
more highly developed mechanisms ....
The same conclusion may be deduced from the fact that the 
enumeration in Article 113 of the subjects covered by 
commercial policy (changes in tariff rates, the conclusion 
of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of
uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy and 
measures to protect trade) is conceived as a non-exhaustive 
enumeration which must not, as such, close the door to the 
application in a Community context of any other process 
intended to regulate external trade.
These developments could at first sight suggest a process 
not unlike that which occurred in most federal states -- a 
monopolization of external contacts by, and a concentration of 
treaty making power in the hands of, the central government. This 
conclusion could not be further than the truth for reasons 
inherent in the institutional structure of the Community 
amplified by its political process. In particular I can mention




























































































the following two factors:
First, we must remember that the above process of expansion 
was confined to areas of external economic relations however 
widely defined. Explicit problems of, say, defense and other 
issues of foreign affairs in the classical sense remained 
entirely in the hands of the Member States.
Second, the Member States reacted to the increased margin of 
competence of the Community to engage in external relations by 
tightening their grip on the actual procedure of treaty making 
(negotiating and implementing process. It must never be forgotten 
that the central legislative/decisional body of the Community 
the Council of Ministers and its sub-organs - consists of 
representatives of the State governments. As such it was able 
over the years to reduce the autonomous role of the Commission in 
the external relations process in all its phases.
Although Article 228 and Article 113 provide explicitly that 
negotiations of Community agreements would be in the hands of the 
(supranational) Commission, and only final conclusion of the 
agreement would fall to the (intergovernmental) Council of 
Ministers, the Member States were able to emasculate this 
provision. They did this by insisting that a seemingly innocuous 
sub-committee of the Council established by the Treaty to assist 
the Commission in negotiations would in fact hold the latter to a 
mere plenipotentiary status. In addition, by insisting all too 
often that prospective Community agreements be concluded on a 
mixed basis -- by the Community and the Member States together 
—  there would be automatic Member State representation at the 
negotiation phase.
Thus, although the external and internal environment forced 
the Community to an expanded external economic posture, the 
process of its execution moved away from a "supranational" 
centralized model, to a more classical intergovernmental one. As 
Community external relations grew so did the role of the Member 
States within this process. This, incidentally, has been a 
constant feature of almost all Community activity.
C . The Emergence of the Framework for Political Cooperation. 17/
a. The Starting Point
Whereas Community activity in the field of external economic
relations found its basis in the Treaties themselves, foreign 
policy proper (high politics) was as we have seen, excluded from 
the Community process. The creation of the Framework for 
Political Cooperation as a mechanism for joint European activity
17. For an uptodate treatment on which I relied and a full
bibliography, see Stein,European Political Cooperation as a 





























































































in this area might therefore seem as a process distinct and even
detached from the internal Community processes described above. 
Although this is the classical view taken in the literature, our 
view is that a closer look will reveal that the same forces which 
shaped the evolution of external relations mechanisms conditioned 
the development of Political Cooperation.
There was a multiple rationale for the creation of the
Framework. The "objective" reason was of course rooted in the 
claim that given the actual state of internal European 
integration, the failure to operate in the field of foreign 
policy was a waste of a significant potential. In other words 
that a common European foreign policy would be able to project 
onto the world environment the joint power of the partners, a 
power that was greater than the sum of the individual units. A 
Europe which would act and react as a single actor to world 
events would by this vision be more effective than hitherto.
There was also an internal, "subjective", reason. In 1969,
when the idea of the Framework was concretely launched, the 
Community was emerging from of period of sustained political 
stagnation associated with de Gaulle's long term in office and 
recovering from the most immediate after effects of the 
Luxembourg crisis.18/
and alongside the
The Community was to be "relaunched" 19/ 
decision to accept the three new Member States, the principal 
concrete political initiative was the plan to set up the 
Framework for Political Cooperation. We may call this second 
reasoning the "reflexive" function of European Political 
Cooperation; the aim here was to find new areas in relation to 
which Europe could manifest her newly found (and short lived) 
"political will" as a sign of progress and hope.
Whereas both the objective and subjective rationale pointed
towards a rosy future in terms of the Framework for Political 
Cooperation, we find in reality already at its inception powerful 
countervailing forces. Recalling our brief account of the 
evolution of external relations, it should come as no surprise 
that the first important steps in the evolution of Political 
Cooperation coincided with the institutionalized strengthening of 
the intergovernmental component in the European Community, namely 
the creation of the European Council of Heads of State and 
Government. This appears to be an almost constant factor in the 
mature phases of European integration. Substantive progress is 
bought at the price of decline in the unique decisional 
characteristics of the Community.20/ In this case, the equation 
was at its extreme: the Framework for Political Cooperation was
18. See Greilsammer,Theorizing European Integration in Its Four 
Periods, 2 Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 129 
(1976).
19. Id.
20. See Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of



























































































to be completely outside the Treaties. It was not sufficient that 
in the Community of the 70s, in which the Luxembourg Accord was 
an accepted way of life, the decisional process was dominated 
totally by the intergovernmental Council of Ministers, often at 
the constitutional expense of the Commission. For Political 
Cooperation , at least as initially conceived, any EEC contact 
was considered anathema. The European Political Cooperation 
institutions and procedures were thus to be insulated from any 
"contaminating" European Community contact. In a famous incident, 
typical of those early "watertight" days, the Foreign Ministers 
of the Community were forced to end a meeting in Copenhagen 
wearing one hat, and travel to Brussels to meet wearing their 
other hat.21/ The Commission was emarginated from the Political 
Cooperation procedures or, at best, barely tolerated. It is 
telling that the only Community organ which had an official role 
in Political Cooperation was the European Parliament. But, not 
only was this an organ which had virtually no impact on the 
Community game, especially in the pre-direct election days, its 
role in Political Cooperation was extremely limited.227 This 
separation, symptomatic of the inherent contradiction of the 
process of European integration was reflected in the very 
definition of the objectives of the Framework.
b. The setting up and initial evolution of the Framework.
At the famous December 1969 Hague Summit, the Heads of 
Government and State launched the idea of the Framework for 
Political Cooperation by agreeing
to instruct the Ministers for Foreign Affairs to study the 
best way of achieving progress in the matter of political 
unification .... The Ministers would be expected to report 
before the end of July 1970.
The result was the October 1970 Luxembourg Report. Later we 
shall see the mechanisms of the Framework for Political 
Cooperation but we should note here the cautiousness in which the 
objectives are expressed. Thus the Ministers defined the 
objectives as follows:
to ensure, through regular exchanges of information and 
consultations, a better mutual understanding on the great 
international problems;
to strengthen [Member State] solidarity by promoting the 
harmonization of their views, the co-ordination of the 
positions, and where it appears possible and desirable, 
common actions.
21. Recalled in Stein note 17 supra.





























































































The language is extremely cautious, the objectives limited, 
and the cleavage between the high aspirations of the Hague 
full economic and monetary European Union within a decade -- and 
the grim down-to-earth realism of the Ministers very marked. The 
operational details set up by the Luxembourg Report were not far 
reaching. The Framework for Political Cooperation was to be non- 
organic. It would depend on its activities on the co-ordinated 
apparatus of the Member States -- ministerial meetings and the 
like —  and was to be outside the EEC framework. Thus the Report 
provided drily that
Should the work of [the Framework for Political Cooperation] 
affect the activities of the European Communities, the 
Commission will invited to make known its views.
In the 1972 Paris Summit, the Heads of State and Government 
endorsed the creation of the Framework, indeed they sought its 
improvement by increasing the frequency of meetings among the 
Foreign Ministers and saw more clearly the linkage of the 
Framework to the EEC. In the language of the Final Communique
They considered that the aim of their co-operation was to 
deal with problems of current interest and, where possible, 
to formulate common medium and long-term positions, keeping 
in mind, inter alia, the international political 
implications for and effects of Community Policies under 
construction.
Interestingly, the idea of common action is played down; by 
contrast the relevance of the Community is spelt out more clearly 
in the past. The Framework for Political Cooperation was 
consolidated in the July 1973 second Ministerial Copenhagen 
Report. Beyond the self-congratulatory rhetoric of this Report 
the following points were of significance. Although the basic 
objective remained the same, the operational machinery was 
strengthened and in most important aspects was to become the 
foundation of the Framework to this day. Significantly, each 
Member States undertook
as a general rule not to take up final positions [on common 
European foreign policy problems - however these may be 
defined) without prior consultation with its partners within 
the framework of the political co-operation machinery.
The linkage to the Community was made more explicit even 
thought the Report insisted on the principled distinction between 
the Framework and the Community. I can only mention in passing a 
point which illustrates this theme in a rather dramatic fashion: 
The test of the Framework for Political Cooperation as 
consolidated by the Copenhagen Report was to come more rapidly 
than the Minister envisaged with the outbreak of the Yora-Kippur 
War in October 1973. The Framework proved totally inadequate to 
deal with the situation and Europe displayed a shameful sight of 
disunity and individual Member State self-interest. As we shall 
analyze below, and return to in our evaluative conclusions, the 
Framework did provide a useful mechanism for an orderly



























































































If we skip thirteen years ahead from the first Luxembourg 
Report to the most recent Solemn Declaration on European Union23/ 
signed in Stuttgart in June 1933, we shall find that in terms of 
the objectives • there have been no dramatic changes in the 
conception of the Framework for Political Cooperation. The Member 
States acknowledge that "increasing problems of international 
politics [render] necessary [the] reinforcement of European 
Political Cooperation". And yet despite this acknowledgement the 
new formulation of the objectives of the framework underscores 
the inherent ambivalence and contradiction in the notion of a 
European foreign policy. It is worth citing the new formulation 
in extensu. The Solemn Declaration defines the following 
measures:
intensified consultations with a view to permitting
timely joint action on all major foreign policy
questions of interest to the Ten as a whole.
prior consultation with the other Member States in
advance of the adoption of final positions ....The 
[Member States] underline their undertaking that each 
... will take full account of the positions of its 
partners and give due weight to the adoption and 
implementation of common European positions when 
working out national positions and taking national 
action.
development and extension of the practice by which the
views of the Ten are defined and consolidated in the 
form of common positions which then constitute a 
central point of reference for Member State policy, 
coordination of positions of Member States on the
political and economic aspects of security.
increased contacts with third countries in order to
give the Ten greater weight as an interlocutor in the 
foreign policy field.
closer cooperation in diplomatic and administrative
matters between the missions of the Ten in third 
countries.
the search for common positions at major international 
conferences attended by one or more of the Ten and 
covering questions dealt with in Political Cooperation.
It is clear thus that one is not speaking here of a single
policy, with a single policy making apparatus and a single policy 
execution apparatus. The objectives of the Framework are in fact 
inherent in the name: Political Cooperation. The major actors
remain the Member States. Where the interest exists joint action 
would be encouraged with the Framework mechanisms facilitating



























































































this joint action. Even the formulation of a common position, the
t rii
i l  r.jnom 
in a aerini LtM.: ■ • urLi 
ni
hall mark of the Framework, is to serve as a basis and reference 
point for national foreign policy. As if tó underline this point 
one can cite the Greek "reservation" at the time òf signing the 
Solemn Declaration in which it stated that:
in signing this declaration Greece states that nothing may
restrain its right to determine its foreign policy in 
accordance with its national interests.
In many ways then, Political Cooperation as initially
conceived was the story of the mountain which turned out tò be a 
molehill. However, as in the case of external ièìations, the 
dynamics of the. international environment as well as internal 
political pressures forced certain mutations on thè original 
framework. The result is still a far cry from a veritable Europe 
speaking, let alone acting, with one voice. And even today, five 
years after it was written the sober conclusion of von den 
Gablentz retains its truth: the Framework for Political
Cooperation constitutes "... the world's most advanced model of 
collective diplomacy ...[but]...neither the cdmraunity nor the 
[Ten] seem to have managed to perform the essential task of any 
foreign policy, namely to convert internal! sfierigth'ând rèsburcës-
into external influence on world affairs".24/—  J-ravrasTr-girrTliflr- asvom noxususcooDnoX'CnJox. erti Oj .■nomevout.j/ x yino arid bflfi 
ydsuonw I shorn eiiiufiqiui erti need a 6ri*yd il ebon suuiul
c .  How the Framework for Political Cooperation 'Dorks.25/
For our purposes a detailed description of the 'Ffame#0rfc:erS
bns s s u s S i  ' v b f f l a of cu res v e n t soiiori) pir'lTti'-not necessary and sufficient fop,present‘.purposes will b ë  A brief 
resume. Since launching the concrete., idea of the Framework in the 
Summit of 1 969, the institutional' aspects 'of ' Political 
Cooperation have been revised several times leading-1'tôoxthë
following pattern of institutions and medianisms.26/; ■ , . , ■ „ --  »C qiKTXO
oh 'rS=9ïfi3'î .qr uoa nsec aeri aexudaini.T.
1. At the aeex: of the institutional, framewoffe;- formally, in 
fact, above it - stands the European'’Council1'o£ îiêâds ‘df-°Stat'd 
and Government which represents since 1974 the formalization1°bf 
hitherto irregular meetings, which characterized.Community life 
since the early 60s. The European Council, itself an organ, 
strictly speaking outside the Treaty framework,2/7'is thus the 
ultimate forum for coordination of, and pronouncements on, 
foreign policy issues. The European Council'can be seised of
24. Von den Gablentz,: Luxembourg levi si ted or thè' importance 'of
European Political Cooperation, 16 C.il.L.Rev. 635 (1 979)'. :
25. See Stein -nptejrl 7 supra..#11! rafepejnqp.s .therein. .
^ ®  - 4®..^nqmx anxaiaoo II .eeaubsoouc: ucoiH "ì q r1 r26. See .text to note. 23 supra. . . .. ..... . . : - - - >•*•»■*. - - 8DX8 XBnoxJsusqo
- - 5 ;j siO'x hsnxlsb a s iied  t bns ( apnj fast] rr a '  - b i n r27. Although outside the Treaty, framework, thé European ;çôüïrçil is
very much part of the EC machinery a fact fuHy-recognized- in— the 




























































































issues by its own motion and/or on the recommendation of the 
lower tiers of the Framework.
2. At the formal head of the Framework stand the Foreign
Ministers who constitute the mainstay of the framework, with 
meetings taking place at least 4 times a year and in reality far 
more frequently. Their formal forum is the Conference of the Foreign Affairs Ministers meeting on European Political 
Cooperation matters. Their function is both constitutive - they 
may issue declarations in the name of the Framework - or 
preparatory for meetings of the Heads of State and Government.
3. A Political Committee (the Davignon Committee) consisting
of the Directors of Political Affairs in the ten foreign 
ministries, meet regularly and serve as the main continuous 
preparatory forum for the political echelons of the Framework for 
Political Cooperation. A possible parallel within the Community 
bureaucracy would be the COREPER which prepares the Council of 
Ministers' meetings. Although the Political Committee provides a 
measure of continuity transcending, for example, political change 
of office in any one of the Member States, the Framework for 
Political Cooperation has no permanent secretariat despite the 
frequent calls to establish one. The Presidency of Political 
Cooperation moves with the Presidency of the Community at six 
month intervals and the only improvement to the disruption 
inherent in this modality has been the tripartite model whereby 
the actual presidency, the previous one and the future one meet 
in a coordinatory forum throughout the structure of the 
Framework.28/
4. Working Groups may be set up to study specific issues and 
they, in turn, may appoint groups of experts. The latter do not 
have an independent existence and they are strictly issue or 
region oriented.
5. A "Group of Correspondents" in the various foreign 
ministries has been set up. They are the Framework for Political 
Cooperation "Desk" in each capital and their task extends also to 
monitoring and following up Political Cooperation decisions and 
declarations.
6. Embassies of the Ten are associated within the Framework 
with a view to a two-way coordination with the European centre. 
Likewise, the Member State representations within international 
organizations, especially the UN, have the same association. The 
Ambassadorial contacts becomes important in times of crisis such 
as the Iranian affair. A special Telex system COREU is used to 
handle the communication traffic of the Framework. It is said to 
carry a significant amount of communications.
7. In the recent 1981 London Report, the Foreign Ministers 
"codified" their procedures. It contains improvements to the 
operational side of the Framework (such as better preparation of 
Ministerial Meetings) and a better defined role for the rotating 
presidency as the spokesman of the Ten. The most noticeable




























































































improvement has been the establishment of Crisis Procedures:
The Political Committee or, if necessary, a ministerial 
meeting will convene within forty-eight hours at the request 
of three Member States.
The same procedure will apply in third countries at the 
level of Heads of Mission.
In order to improve the Capacity of the Ten to react in an 
emergency, working groups are encouraged to analyze areas of 
potential crisis and to prepare a range of possible reactions 
by the Ten.
In most other respects the London Report did not adopt any 
radical changes.
d. European Political Cooperation and the EEC.29/
In some sense the original rigid distinction between the
Community and the Framework for Political Cooperation was not 
only counterproductive but also impossible. At its highest 
echelons the persons constituting the leadership of both 
structures were one and the same and artificial devices such as 
separate agendas and even separate meeting places could hardly 
create a de facto separation between the two. How, not only do 
the Ministers meet in one session, albeit with different agendas, 
first as the EEC Council of Ministers and then as the Conference 
of Political Cooperation, but since 1974 in the informal Gymnich 
style meetings the agenda may include both Community and European 
Political Cooperation items.
This sense of reality asserted itself also as regards
Commission participation in the Framework for Political
Cooperation. The 1981 London Report finally affirmed:
Within the framework of the established rules and procedures
the Ten attach importance to the Commission of the European 
Communities being fully associated with political 
cooperation, at all levels.
This does not mean that the Commission is a fully fledged
participant. It is not privy to the full traffic of COREU nor is 
it a participant in the Group of Correspondents. On the other 
hand it participates, albeit without decisional power, in 
meetings of the European Council, the Conference of Foreign 
Ministers and the Political Committee of Political Cooperation. 
If there are problems of coordination, these will assert 
themselves at the operational level, say within various
international organizations, where the division of competences
29. See Bonvicini, The Problem of Coordination between Political





























































































between the two setups is not clear, rather than at the central 
European level.
The stickiest point of all, however, is not the
organizational cooperation and contact between European Community 
and the Framework for Political Cooperation. It is the
substantive competences of the Community that are at issue. As we 
noted above the resistance of the Member States to incorporation 
of Political Cooperation within the Community derives from two 
interrelated factors:
a. The Member States do not wish to submit themselves
in matters of foreign policy to the Community 
decisional and normative discipline.
b. They do not wish the Community, for its part, to
increase its competences into fields considered outside 
the Treaties.
But as I have maintained all along, world affairs do not
arrange themselves in a neat way respecting the division of 
competences between Community external relations and European 
Political Cooperation. Thus, for example, it is absurd to think 
that a decision to open trade negotiations with, say, Yugoslavia 
or even Israel -- matters coming within the exclusive external 
economic relations competence of the EEC -- would not be 
influenced by political considerations which under current
definitions fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member 
States within the Framework for Political Cooperation. The 
question may be asked in an even more dramatic form. May 
decisions on EEC trade and cooperation agreements be formally 
taken on political grounds. This may seem to be an unreal and 
hair-splitting problem, but it has far reaching constitutional 
repercussions. In reality, the answer is of course yes. But, if 
this de facto reply is translated into juridical forms, it would 
seem that an eventual merge between Community and Political 
Cooperation is inevitable.
The sensitivity of this issue and its political significance
are easily demonstrated in the context of economic sanctions 
taken by the Community/Member States as a political measure. As 
will be recalled, immediately after the outbreak of the
Falklands/Malvina crisis, Britain imposed full economic sanctions 
on Argentina. This in itself is already problematic since 
economic sanctions, in dry legal language mean a breach of the 
Community's Common Commercial Policy with its export and import 
regimes. However the Treaty provides in Article 224 for the 
possibility of a Member State finding itself in war of departing 
from the normal regime albeit after consultations.
What then of the position of the other Member States who did
not find themselves at war with Argentina. It is plausible that 
the language of Article 224 would allow in such a situation other 
Member States joining in the sanctions on an individual national 
basis. The Article speaks of
measures which a Member State may be called upon to take in
the event of ... war or serious international tension




























































































Be the legal argument as it may 30/
, the Member States took 
another course of action. The Preamble to Council Regulation 
(EEC) 877/82 of April 16, 1982 —  a strict Community legal
measure —  provided, inter alia, as follows:
The Council of the European Community
Whereas the serious situation resulting from the invasion of 
the Falkland Islands by Argentina ... has given rise to 
discussions in the context of European political cooperation 
which have led in particular to the decision that economic 
measures will be taken with regard to Argentina in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Community 
Treaties ;
Whereas ...it has proved important to take urgent and 
uniform measures; whereas the Member States have therefore 
decided to adopt a Council Regulation pursuant to the 
Treaty;
Whereas ...the interests of the Community and the Member 
States demand the temporary suspension of imports of all 
products originating in Argentina;
has adopted this Regulation:
Imports of all products originating in Argentina ... are 
hereby suspended.
This remarkable document is interesting for in several 
senses: First, it illustrates most clearly the almost inevitable 
breakdown on the institutional level of the demarcation of EEC 
and EPC. Second, it illustrates that political will existing, the Ten within the Framework for Political Cooperation have at their 
disposal more than declarations as an instrument of foreign 
policy. Thirdly, the formal decision imposing sanctions was 
constituted on the basis of Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome, 
and was thus to be considered as a measure coming fully within 
the exclusive Common Commercial Policy of the EEC. Here then was 
a case whereby not only were the Member States within the 
Framework for Political Cooperation "borrowing" a Community
30. For a full discussion see Kauper, Community Sanctions against 
Argentina: Lawfulness under Community and International Law in




























































































instrument to further their political goals, but a strict reading 
would suggest that henceforth such a decision to impose economic 
sanctions could legitimately be taken by the Community decisional 
process, that the decision would be binding on recalcitrant 
Member States and, most dramatically of all, that since the 
Common Commercial Policy was exclusive, such action could not be 
taken by the Member States outside the Community framework.31/ We 
have here then in a nutshell both the utility -- in terras of 
efficacy -- of a Community foreign policy action and the danger 
—  in terms of loss of autonomy - to the Member States of such a 
construction.
Needless to say the Member States did not remain aloof to
the potential dangers. For example, Denmark, relying on a dubious 
interpretation of a safeguard measure in the Treaty, insisted on 
implementing the sanctions decision by an act of its own 
Parliament, reasserting Member State sovereignty and underlining 
the exceptional character of the particular sanction .situation. 
Interestingly, not much later, the Community "froze" for a short 
period the negotiations for the financial instrument in the 
Israel - Community Cooperation Agreement, clearly another
Community measure, or at least Mixed measure, prompted by Euro­
pean Political Cooperation considerations.
It is thus inevitable that in the future the artificial gap
between the Community and the Framework for Political Cooperation 
will narrow even further even if a formal integration of the two 
is still far away.
e. Political Cooperation Policy Making: Active, Reactive and
Reflexive.
The mechanisms which I have described above allow the
Member States to coordinate their positions and, if the political 
will exists, to adopt a common position and even common action. 
Given this limited operational range, what are the realistic 
gains which may be obtained through the Framework? Let us 
consider the Framework for Political Cooperation in the context 
of the classical distinctions, borrowed form the analysis of 
economic policy, between aims/objectives and 
instruments/measures.32/ It is here that our earlier allusion to 
active, reactive and reflexive policy may become fruitful.
It is important to remember that these notions are 
essentially didactic. In reality one will fuse into the other. 
But they may help us in evaluating the successes and failures of 
the Framework.
31. Id.
32. See Daintith, Legal Analysis of Economic Policy, Working Paper 




























































































An active policy will seeks to influence events directly; to 
posit "Europe" as an initiator of policy and a veritable world 
actor. Active policy would typically be based on a notion that 
all events with an international implication are relevant to the 
actor.
A reactive policy will be one which is less concerned with 
direct influence, but rather with reacting to world events so as 
to minimize costs to the reactive actor.
Under various guises these two elements exist in most inter- 
statal foreign policy making.
European Political Cooperation ushers forth a third policy 
component, additional to the active and reactive ones, namely 
reflexive policy. Here the chief, though rarely exclusive, 
concern will be the actual formation of a common policy as an 
integrative value per se.
It should be noted, especially in the context of the i-liddle 
East conflict, that the transnational nature of the reflexive 
policy within the Political Cooperation Framework allows through 
the evolution of what has been called the Shield Effect of an 
external dimension as well. Member States may adopt a reactive 
position, for example critical of Israel, and attribute it to the 
discipline of the Common European policy established within 
Political Cooperation. The shield effect could, in principle, 
operate also on the internal political level whereby a 
government, in the face of, say, internal parliamentary or 
popular opposition to a course of foreign policy, could explain 
it as following the common European line. Reflexive policy could 
be given a less charitable interpretation; it might be regarded 
as substitute politics —  an empty gesture of European make- 
believe integration but in reality a cover up for a failure to 
deal with the more pressing internal problems of Europe.
The active-reactive-reflexive triangle may relate also to 
the instruments and measures adopted for the prosecution of the 
policy. What instruments are available to the Framework?
In one sense none at all - except the common declaration (at 
times a potent instrument in international affairs). In another 
sense, the Framework has at its disposal the entire array of 
instruments of the Member States as well as those "belonging" to 
the Community. The tendency to use the declaration as the most 
common output of the Framework might suggest a paucity of means 
which conditions a reactive/reflexive orientation. This in our 
view would be a mistake. Given the political will, the Member 
States have at their disposal not only the Community instruments 
which can be utilized by way of retortion or sanction but also 
every combination of national policy instrument. If the Framework 
has failed to assert itself actively the reason lies in the lack 
of political will or, indeed, substantive agreement among the 
partners and not in the absence of instruments. I
I insist on the trichotomy -- active reactive reflexive 
because I believe it enables a better evaluation of the 




























































































the famous 1930 Venice declaration -- at face value the European 
entry into active foreign policy making in the Middle East. 
Europe was putting forward to the chagrin of the United States, 
or so it seemed, an alternative to American peacemaking efforts. 
This was to be characterized as the European Initiative.
In active foreign policy terms -- the actual ability to 
influence events in the region and realize the declared 
objectives and methods contained in the Venice declaration -- the 
European Initiative was a failure.
By contrast, in reactive terms, the European Initiative is 
at least open to different interpretations. Faced with increasing 
Arab pressure that European states take a stronger pro-Arab stand 
in relation to the conflict, Europe managed, to appear to be 
doing something, while not changing the substance of her policy 
all that much. Relations with Israel became strained for a short 
time, but, for example, there was no economic spill over. All in 
all, on this reading of events Europe managed to maintain a 
precarious relational status quo without stirring the waters too 
much. If, thus, we hypothesise a goal of containment rather than 
active influence, we may consider the European initiative less 
than a failure.
In reflexive terms the Middle East has provided the real 
laboratory in which all mechanisms of the Framework were 
practiced. And on a declaratory level, it has in fact led, fully 
using the shield effect, to a convergence of European attitudes 
towards various issues connected with the conflict such as 
Palestinian self-determination and a possible role for the PLO. 
The analytical categories help us thus provide a differentiated 
evaluation to Political Cooperation output.
D. Towards a Revised Concept of a. European Foreign Policy.
How then are we to assess these mechanisms developed for a 
European foreign policy? The tendency in the literature has often 
been to dismiss European foreign policy, and especially the 
Framework for Political Cooperation as a failure, as procedural 
substitutes for substantive accord, as entirely reflexive with no 
active or even reactive element. To the extent that one looks at 
substantive results we cannot but share in these pessimistic 
conclusions. At the same time one should not minimize the 
enormous task which the Member States face. For they are trying 
to achieve something which is completely novel and untried in the 
international arena. The basic premise of the foreign posture is, 
in the Language of the Hague Summit
a Europe composed of States which, while preserving their 
national characteristics, are united in their essential 
interests
The federal state experience, as we already noted, would 
suggest that the task of preserving national characteristics and 
statehood while operating a common foreign posture is impossible. 
And indeed much of the negative criticism of the Framework for 




























































































been conditioned by the foreign policy concept developed in other 
non-unitary entities and especially the federal state. The 
criticism is usually based on a criterion against which to judge 
the Framework which adopts an ideal type model "... in which 
common institutions are in a position to make and carry through 
all necessary foreign policy decisions for the Community and 
thereby replace the national foreign policy of the Member 
States." 33/
This ideal type model frequently and wrongly referred to as
a federal model is not only alien to the original Political 
Cooperation concept which sought to separate the Framework from 
Community structures, but is also alien to the entire modern 
trend of European integration in the field of foreign policy 
which tends to suggest, both in external relations and in 
Political Cooperation, a new experiment of a non-unitary foreign 
policy process and foreign posture which may veritably be called 
the federal option of foreign affairs.
In order to justify what might appear to be a colossal
terminological faux pas, two clarifications are necessary. The 
first concerns the concept of federalism. One often finds in the 
literature a persistent confusion between, and an erroneous 
identification of, two distinct concepts: federalism as an
organizational principle and a federation (the federal state) as 
one specific manifestation of that principle. Slazar dispells the 
confusion by reference to the etymology of federalism the roots 
of which may be found
first in the biblical hebrew terra brit (covenant], then
the latin foedus (literally 'covenant') from which the 
modern "federal " is derived.... Elaborated by the 
Calvinists in their federal theology, the concept 
formed the basis for far more than a form of political 
organization.... The original use of the term deals 
with contractual linkages that involve power sharing -- 
among individuals, among groups, among states. This 
usage is more appropriate than the definition of modern 
federations, which represents only one aspect of the 
federal idea and one application of the federal 
principle. 34/
Pescatore reflects the same reasoning in the concrete 
context of the European community:
[T]he methods of federalism are not only a means of 
organizing states. It would rather seem that federalism 
is a political and legal philosophy which adapts itself 
to all political contexts on both the municipal and the 
international level, wherever and whenever two basic 
prerequisites are fulfilled: the search for unity,
33. This view is explained in Allen, Rummel , 'Vessels (eds.) 
European Political Cooperation, (1982) who actually reject it.




























































































combined with genuine respect for the autonomy and the 
legitimate interests of the participant entities. 35/
As we noted above the paradox is that federal states
typically have a unitary non-federal foreign policy. By contrast 
it would seem that the Community and its Member State, clearly 
not a federation, are experimenting with a genuine federal 
foreign policy. In the legal world of external relations the key 
indicator of this development is found in the growing usage of 
the so called mixed agreement which involves participation in one 
and the same international treaty of the Community, its Member 
States and the third state. The first trade agreements of the 
Community where of a "pure" Community type. The more recent 
practice was to move to the mixed type. In the political world 
the expression of this federal rationale is the Framework for 
Political Cooperation which rejects a unitarist centrist model in 
favor of the far more complex cooperative model.
How does federal conception measure up against the
objectives of the Framework for Political Cooperation? Measured 
against the Reflexive objectives it might seem that this federal 
conception is at odds with a vigorous notion of integration or at 
least a second best way of achieving integrational goals. I 
reject this conclusion as too simplistic. It rests on a crude, 
and perhaps outmoded centre-periphery model according to which
—  political systems always have a centre and
periphery;
—  it is what happens in the centre which is
politically important;
-- integration consists of constructing a powerful 
centre to which the periphery will be tied.
This has not only been the "pontifical" dogma of Commission
and Court. It is an open or tacit conception in most though not 
all of the literature on the European Community.
The alternative to this view expressed in modern federal
theory 36/ rejects the centre-periphery model and regards 
federalism as a structure which embraces the body politic rather 
then providing a focus. On this basis integration is no longer
measured in terms of centre-periphery relationships but in the
cohesion of the framework as a whole. Integration means a
strengthening of whole and parts together and interdependently. 
Mixed agreement in the legal world and Political Cooperation in 
the political world correspond perhaps to this Reflexive model. 
Certainly the Member States maintain their power and
35. P.Pescatore in T. Sandalow and E. Stein, Courts and Free 
Markets (1982) Preface.




























































































international profile - but they do enhance their capacity of
acting out of a common position and on occasion even in concert.
Thinking along a federal conception necessitates a
réévaluation also of the active and reactive objectives and 
instruments of the system. Perhaps the holiest cow of Political 
Cooperation phraseology has been the oft-repeated slogan which 
postulated the Framework as enabling Europe to speak with one 
voice. This was to become not merely a political mobilizing 
instrument but also received an intellectual underpinning by 
those who have asserted that through this unison of voice and 
action Europe would best be able to translate or realize in the
international field the enormous power which is consonant with
the Ten's importance. Standard critique has been that through 
Europe's inability to speak with one voice this potential has not 
in fact been realized.
At the risk of slaughtering this holy cow, could it be that 
even on the non-Reflexive level there might be advantages in 
abandoning, at least on occasion the One Voice concept? To be 
sure, in many situations it will be through concerted and unified 
action that Europe will best be able to make effective policy. At 
the same time there might be situations where the united concept 
will represent a loss: a loss of the potentialities inherent in a 
pluralistic foreign posture. One voice could represent a loss of 
subtlety, a need to choose single options and the risk of 
dichotomizing reaction to such a single European Policy. A 
pluralistic approach, perhaps more difficult to manage, gives 
Europe the potential to play a more subtle "game". It may use the 
special historical connections of the Member States to the objects 
of the policy. Consider in this context the different 
relationships which ,say, Holland, Denmark, Britain and Germany 
have towards, and the perception of those states in, say, Israel. 
It may be through different positions adopted by the Member 
States which could put pressure on other actors while keeping 
communications open. I
I do not propose to elaborate this point much further. If 
I were to translate it to a slogan I should say that the 
descriptive and prescriptive trend of European foreign policy is 
towards a Europe singing like a choir —  remembering of course 
that the choir concept is not meant to replace totally the one 
voice. Training several different voices to sing in harmony is 
at the best of times a most difficult task; one should not be 
surprised if for a long time yet the European choir will often 
sing out of tune. Even when successful, one should further not 
forget that a good choir sometimes sings in unison, other times 
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